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11 Introduction
One of the most important margins in intertemporal decision making is the response of
expected consumption growth to a change in the expected interest rate.
Empirical evidence from macroeconomic data about the magnitude of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES) is mixed.
Simple and intuitive arguments for a large IES are provided by two sets of facts that
we will refer to as the levels facts and dierence facts. The levels facts are closely related
to the risk-free rate puzzle discussed by Weil (1989). He points out that it is dicult to
reconcile empirical observations about the average level of risk free returns and the average
level of consumption growth with the intertemporal Euler equation when the maintained
level of risk aversion is large and the discount factor is less than one. The observation that
low risk aversion is required to account for the average level of risk free returns can also be
stated in terms of the IES. Under the assumption of time additive preferences the IES is
the inverse of the risk aversion coecient and only high values of the IES can be reconciled
with data on the average level of consumption growth and the real risk-free interest rate.
Guvenen (2006), for instance, derives a lower bound on the IES of about 0.7 using data on
consumption growth and real returns using U.S data.
A second set of observations that has been used to argue that the IES is large concerns
cross-country dierences in consumption growth and real returns. Lucas (1990) observes
that a small IES implies that a permanent one percentage dierence in the growth rate of
consumption is associated with larger proportionate variations in the real return on capital.
He goes on to argue that it is hard to reconcile a value of the IES as low as 1/2 with the
small dierences in measured real returns on capital across dierent countries. We will
subsequently refer to this observation as the dierence facts.
Perhaps the most inuential empirical evidence in favor of a low value of the IES is
provided by Hall (1988). He estimates the IES using U.S. data on aggregate consumption
and interest rates. The resulting estimates of the IES are close to zero and sometimes
even negative. Hall (1988) concludes that the value of the IES is probably 0.2 or lower. Low
estimated values of the IES have been documented in more recent research as well. Campbell
(2003) nds evidence of a low IES in a variety of countries and Yogo (2004) estimates the
IES to be 0.2 for the U.S. using an estimation strategy that controls for weak instruments.1
This paper makes two contributions. First, we provide two distinct ways to reconcile a
low value of the true IES with the empirical evidence that it is large. Our resolutions arise in
a model in which all agents have identical preferences and the same access to asset markets.
These results do not necessarily imply that the IES is low. The model can also account for
the same macroeconomic evidence with a high IES. This motivates our second contribution
1Yogo's (2004) estimates of the IES are 0.5 or less in the ten other countries he considers.
2which is to provide empirical evidence that the true value of the IES is low. We make this
case by confronting respectively the maintained hypothesis of a high value of the IES and
the maintained hypothesis of a low IES with the regression-based evidence that the IES is
low. An encompassing test indicates that the maintained hypothesis of a low IES (0.35 or
lower) is consistent with the regression based evidence but that the maintained hypothesis
of a large value of the IES of e.g. 1.5 is inconsistent with this evidence.
Agents in our model have Epstein and Zin (1989) (see also Weil (1990)) preferences
and growth is endogenous. Epstein-Zin preferences are convenient because they allow us to
make a meaningful distinction between intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. One
parameter determines the IES or the desired response of expected consumption growth to
an increase in the expected interest rate. A second parameter governs risk aversion: the
change in sure consumption that renders a household indierent to a small wealth bet. These





1  . Our specication of endogenous AK growth in conjunction with an
i.i.d. shock structure makes it possible to get nearly closed form solutions.2
We consider two versions of the model one with complete markets and the other with
incomplete markets for human capital.
Our model with complete markets has the property that the IES must be large in order to
account for the levels facts if the preference discount factor is restricted to be less than one.
This restriction, though is not necessary for existence of an equilibrium in our model (see
also Abel (1999) and Kocherlakota (1990)). In our model equilibrium requires instead that
the eective preference discount factor be less than one.3 Moreover, for reasons described by
Reis (2009) data on consumption and real returns does not identify the preference discount
factor but instead identies the eective preference discount factor which depends on both
the IES and the preference discount factor. Under the assumption of complete markets our
model is consistent with data on average consumption growth and real returns with either a
large IES in conjunction with a low value of the preference discount factor or alternatively
a very low value of the IES with a preference discount factor that is greater than one.
We go on to show that the complete markets model is also consistent with international
evidence on dierences in the return on capital described by Lucas and documented here
when the value of the IES as low as about 0.5.
These ndings are robust in the sense that they hold for a very wide range of settings
of the risk aversion parameter. The model produces the same results when agents are risk
neutral or alternatively highly risk averse with risk aversion coecients of 100.
The assumption of i.i.d. shocks is convenient because it allows us to solve the model
2Epaulard and Pommeret (2003) use this same strategy to solve a complete markets AK model with
Epstein-Zin preferences.
3We formally dene the eective preference discount factor below. In words though it determines where
expected present value utility is summable in a growing economy.
3exactly and provide a simple characterization of the equilibrium. However, the i.i.d. as-
sumption renders the model inconsistent with the observed persistence in output at business
cycle frequencies. We next relax this assumption and use perturbation methods to solve the
model with persistent shocks. The results are virtually identical to the i.i.d case. Allowing
for persistent shocks does improve the model's implications for the business cycle. Simulated
data from the model exhibit a similar degree of persistence to what we see in U.S. data.
Interestingly, the success of the model in accounting for the business cycle is robust to the
value of the IES. Our model reproduces volatility and persistence properties of the U.S. data
equally well with an IES of 0.5 or 1.5.
We next show that regression based estimates of the IES can be used to discriminate
between the maintained hypothesis of a large IES and the maintained hypothesis of a low
IES. Campbell (2003) and Yogo (2004) nd that the estimated coecient in a two stage least
squares (2SLS) regression of consumption growth and the interest rate is low regardless of
which variable is treated as the dependent variable. Yogo (2004) argues that this is a
problem due to weak instruments. We these facts to conduct an encompassing test. When
we posit low values of the IES, simulated data from our model successfully reproduces
these empirical results for either regression. However, when we posit a large value of the
IES instead regressions using data generated from the model estimate the IES to be close
to its true (large) value. This result arises even when the sample size is small. Under the
maintained hypothesis of a large IES the response of consumption to interest rate movements
is so large that there is no weak instrument problem. 2SLS estimates of the IES are large
regardless of which variable appears on the left hand side of the regression.
We also consider a market structure where households face uninsurable idiosyncratic
shocks to their human capital. Human wealth is harder to collateralize than nancial wealth
and the return on human wealth is typically estimated to be higher than the return on
nancial wealth. The IES measures the response of expected consumption growth to a
change in the expected return on total wealth of an individual. Under this form of market
incompleteness, a distinction arises between the return on physical capital, human capital
and total wealth. This distinction has some important implications. As the variance of the
idiosyncratic shock is increased from zero, the return on total wealth also rises and this acts
to lower the eective discount factor. A higher return on total wealth then makes it possible
to reconcile a low IES with both the levels facts and the dierence facts while at the same
time maintaining a value of the preference discount factor that is less than one.
The incomplete markets model imposes stronger restrictions on the range of values of
both the IES and the RRA coecients and this evidence suggests that the magnitude of the
IES is much less than one. Values of the IES above 0.35 imply that the return on human
capital is too low and requires households to be nearly risk neutral if one is to reproduce
the measured variability in labor income. And a value of the IES much below 0.2 implies
4that the return on human capital is implausibly large. The incomplete market specication
produces the best empirical t with an IES of between 0.25 and 0.3 and a RRA coecient
of about 2.
Our work is most closely related to research by Guvenen (2006) who provides an alter-
native reconciliation of a low IES with the aggregate evidence of a high IES. He considers
an incomplete markets model and posits two types of individuals: a small group with a high
IES can participate in asset markets, and a second much larger group with a low IES are
not allowed to purchase equity. The high IES individuals determine the return on assets
but only constitute a small fraction of total consumption.
Our resolutions dier from that of Guvenen (2006) in that all households in our economy
have identical preferences and the same access to nancial markets. The business cycle
properties of our complete markets model with persistent shocks are also similar to those
reported in Guvenen (2006). However, the models we consider here do not have very rich
implications for the cross-sectional distribution of consumption or wealth. The assumption
of unit root idiosyncratic shocks implies that both cross-sectional distributions fan out over
time.
2 The model
We consider an endogenous growth model with aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. The spe-
cic model of risk and growth follows Krebs (2003). However, we generalize his preference
structure and consider the recursive utility function proposed by Epstein and Zin (1989)
and Weil (1989).
2.1 The Model
Consider an economy with a single nal good, yt; that is produced by perfectly competitive






where kt 1 and ht 1 denote the aggregate stock of physical and human capital at the
beginning of period t, respectively, and At is an exogenous productivity shock in period t.
The nal good, yt, can either be consumed or invested in either type of capital:
yt = ct + ik;t + ih;t (2)
where ik;t and ih;t denote, respectively, investment in physical and human capital in period
t.
5The aggregate stocks of physical and human capital evolve according to
kt = ik;t + (1   k;t)kt 1 (3)
ht = ih;t + (1   h;t)ht 1 (4)
where k;t and h;t are exogenous, stochastic rates of depreciation of physical and human
capital. We will use k 1;h 1 > 0 to denote the initial stocks of physical and human capital.
The economy is inhabited by a large number of households with identical preferences.




















where ci;t is the amount of the good consumed in period t by individual i. Here,   measures
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and  measures the degree of relative risk aver-
sion. The constant relative risk aversion utility function is obtained as a special case when
  = 1=. The ow budget constraint for individual i is:
ci;t + ki;t + hi;t = Rk;tki;t 1 + Rh;i;thi;t 1 (6)
and the returns on each type of asset are given by:
Rk;t = 1 + rk;t   k;t
Rh;i;t = 1 + rh;t   h;t + i;t
An important distinction between the two types of capital is that human capital is subject to
an idiosyncratic uninsurable shock, i;t. An individual's situation in period t is summarized
by a realization of the aggregate state St 2 S, and a realization of the individual specic
state sit 2 s. Shocks to productivity and depreciation are assumed to depend only on the
aggregate state: At = A(St), k;t = k(St), h;t = h(St). The idiosyncratic shock to the
return on human capital depends on the individual specic state: i;t = (si;t).
In order to retain analytical tractability, we assume for now that St is identically and
independently distributed (i.i.d.) over time with probability distribution (St), St 2 S
and that sit is independently distributed across individuals and over time with probability
distribution (si;t), sit 2 s.
2.2 Competitive equilibrium
We describe the equilibrium for this economy in three steps. First, we characterize the
solution to the household's problem under the assumption that returns to each asset are
i.i.d. Second, we derive restrictions on factor inputs from rm optimization. Third, we
combine the restrictions of household and rm optimization and characterize the competitive
equilibrium.
6Note that the household's budget constraint can be expressed as:
ci;t + ki;t + hi;t = ai;t
ai;t+1 = Rk;t+1ki;t + Rh;i;t+1hi;t





Then we can rewrite the household budget constraint as:
ai;t+1 = (ai;t   ci;t)[Rk;t+1!k;i;t + Rh;i;t+1(1   !k;i;t)]: (7)
Under the assumption that the returns on each type of capital are i.i.d. the individual's





























i;ci  0 and !k;i 2 (0;1). In the above expression E is the expectation operator.
A characterization of the solution to the household's problem is given in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that returns are i.i.d. and













then the solution to the household's problem (8) has the following properties:
1. The optimal portfolio weight for each individual is constant over time and satises












2. The optimal consumption, ci;t, is linear in wealth and given by:
ci;t = !cai;t (12)
where
!c  1      1 (13)
73. The value function, v(ai) is also linear in wealth and given by:
v(ai) =  vai (14)
where




Proof. We start by conjecturing that the value function is linear in assets v(ai) =  vai and
then verify that this conjecture is correct. Using the conjectured form of the value function
















Then observe that !k will not depend on i, since 0
i is identically distributed across agents
nor will it depend on R0
k or R0
h;i since asset returns are also i.i.d. by assumption. It follows
that the optimal portfolio weight is identical across individuals and given by (11). 4
Next substitute (10) and (16) into (8) to get:






i +  v
1  1






















1 +    1 v  1 1
ai (19)
Using equations (17) and (19) we can now express ci and  v in terms of ai. The resulting
expressions are given in equations (12) and (15).
From Lemma 1 it can be seen that the inequality in equation (9) implies that !c 2 (0;1).
We will refer to    1 as the eective discount factor. Restricting the eective discount
factor to be less than one insures that the expected present value of utility is bounded. We
wish to emphasize that this inequality can be satised when  > 1.5 Below we will report
some parameterizations of the model that have the property that the eective discount factor
is less than one but the preference discount factor exceeds one.
4Although we have not explicitly included a risk free asset here, the fact that the portfolio weight is
identical across all individuals implies the portfolio weight on the risk-free asset will be zero in equilibrium.
see Constantinides and Due (1992) and Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2008) for a similar result.
5See Kocherlakota (1990) for further discussion of this point.














h;i(1   !k) (21)















k (1   !k)1  + 1   0
k (23)
R0
h;i = (1   )A0!
k(1   !k)  + 1   0
h + 0
i (24)
Now if (23) and (24) are substituted into equation (22) this optimality condition can be
expressed in terms of the single choice variable !k. Using the optimal choice of !k,  can











Given solutions to the individual's problem and rm's problem we can now characterize
the competitive equilibrium allocations.
Proposition 1. Let Ra;t+1, !k, and  be given by equations (21), (22) , and (25) and
assume that the eective discount factor satises (9). Then the competitive equilibrium
allocations are:
ci;t = !cai;t (26)
ki;t = (1   !c)!kai;t (27)
hi;t = (1   !c)(1   !k)ai;t (28)
ui;t =  vai;t (29)
ai;t+1 = (1   !c)Ra;i;t+1ai;t (30)
Using these allocations it is straightforward to derive implications for other moments of
interest. Express Ra;i;t+1 as
Ra;i;t+1 =  Ra;t+1 + (1   !k)i;t+1 (31)
9where  Ra;t+1 is the cross-sectional mean of Ra;i;t+1:
 Ra;t+1  At+1!
k(1   !k)1  (32)
+ 1   h;t+1 + !k(h;t+1   k;t+1):
Then we have
Et[Ra;i;t+1] = Et[  Ra;t+1] (33)
Individual wealth follows
ai;t+1 = Ra;i;t+1(1   !c)ai;t (34)






= (1   !c)Et[Ra;i;t+1]: (35)
Dene at+1 to be aggregate per capita wealth. Then
at+1 = (1   !c)  Ra;t+1at (36)












We can derive implications for the expected growth rate of aggregate per capita con-
sumption in a similar way.






= (1   !c)Ra;i;t+1 (38)
And the growth rate of aggregate per capita consumption satises:
ct+1
ct
= (1   !c)  Ra;t+1 (39)












or that the expected growth rate of aggregate consumption and individual consumption are
the same. Using these results we can also derive expressions for the variance of individual












= (1   !c)2 var[  Ra;t+1] (42)
10The expected growth rate of aggregate per capita output can be derived in the following
way. Recall that
kt = (1   !c)!kat;
ht = (1   !c)(1   !k)at
It follows that aggregate per capita output is given by:
yt = At!
k(1   !k)1 (1   !c)at 1 (43)






(1   !c)  Ra;t+1 (44)
Although the risk free asset is not held in equilibrium it is straightforward to derive an
expression for it by resolving the asset allocation problem and allowing for a third asset.



















In this section we describe how we assign parameters to the model, explain how we reconcile
a low value of the IES in the model with some of the empirical evidence that it is large and
provide some new empirical evidence that the value of the IES is low.
3.1 Model Parameterization
We will report simulation results for two market structures. The complete market structure
assumes that households can insure their idiosyncratic shocks to human capital. The allo-
cations and prices for this market structure are found by setting i;t = 0 for all i and all t:
The remainder of the stochastic specication for the complete markets case is as follows.
The aggregate state has two outcomes St 2 f1;2g. We assume that Pr(St = 1) =
Pr(St = 2) = 1
2. For convenience aggregate shocks to each type of depreciation are assumed
to be perfectly correlated so that k;t = h;t = t, for all t. Under these assumptions human
and physical capital have identical risk properties, earn the same real return and thus the
model reduces to an AK setup.
11The productivity and depreciation shocks are parameterized in the following way:
A(St) =
(
E(A)   (A); if St = 1
E(A) + (A); if St = 2
(St) =
(
E()   (); if St = 1
E() + (); if St = 2
The incomplete market structure maintains the same structure for the aggregate shocks.
The idiosyncratic shock i;t though now has two states si;t = f1;2g with Pr(si;t = 1) =
Pr(si;t = 2) = 1
2.
We want to illustrate that a low value of the IES in the model is consistent with empirical
evidence used to assert that it is large. We choose a calibration strategy that allows us to
reproduce some basic facts from the data as we vary the IES and the relative risk aversion
parameters. We set the capital share parameter  = 0:3 and set the average depreciation rate
E() = 0:08. The remaining parameters fE(A);(A);();g are set to match the following
targets: an investment share of output of 0.25; output growth of 2 percent per annum; a
standard deviation of output growth of 0:0237; and a standard deviation of consumption
growth of 0:0168.6
Our calibration strategy has the property that the eective discount factor is held xed
as   and  are varied. It also implies that the value of  changes as we alter  and  . We
view this as an attractive way to proceed because it makes it possible to disentangle the
eects of a change in   on discounting from its eects on intertemporal substitution. If we
were to x  instead then a change in   would aect both the eective discount rate and
also the IES.
The incomplete markets model is calibrated to reproduce the same facts as the complete
markets model and the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to human capital is set
to 0.18.7
3.2 The facts to be explained
We consider two types of facts that have led macroeconomists to conclude that the IES is
large. Campbell (2003) and Guvenen (2006) among others have pointed out that it is hard
to reconcile a low value of the IES with data on the average level of per capita consumption
growth and the average level of real interest rates. We refer to these observations as the
levels facts.
Lucas (1990) argues that it is dicult to reconcile a low IES with international evidence
on cross-country dierences in average output growth rates and cross-country dierences in
the return on capital. We refer to these observations as the dierence facts.
6The choices for the standard deviation of output and consumption growth are taken from Krebs (2003).
7This value is also taken from Krebs (2003).
12We now consider each type of evidence in turn.
3.2.1 Levels Facts
One can derive a lower bound on the size of the IES using data on the average level of the
growth rate of consumption and the average level of a safe short-tem bond by appealing to
the intertemporal rst order condition of an individual.















1 1=  and Rf;t+1 is the risk-free rate on a discount bond that pays o in period












Now take a second order approximation of (47) and solve for Rf;t+1:9























Finally, assume perfect foresight: drop expectations; assume all agents are identical; and set
Ra;t+1 = Rf;t+1 to get:









This equation has been used by Weil (1989) and Campbell (2003) to document the risk-free
rate puzzle. It has also been used by Guvenen (2006) to derive a lower bound on the IES.
To illustrate how this is done, following Guvenen (2006), suppose that consumption grows
at the rate of 2 percent per annum, that the risk-free interest rate is 3 percent and impose
an upper bound of one on . If  = 1 equation (49) yields a value of   = 0:66. Note that
this is a lower bound on the value of the IES in the sense that if  < 1 instead the resulting
value of   is larger.
We wish to point out though that the choice of an upper bound of one for  is arbitrary.
Under the assumption of perfect foresight the restriction on  that is required for existence
of an equilibrium in our model is  < R
1=  1
f . What this means is that if we posit a value
of   < 1 there will be an interval of values of  > 1 that are consistent with equilibrium.
8This condition also holds if the i.i.d. assumption is relaxed.
9See e.g. Campbell (2003) for this derivation.
133.2.2 Dierence Facts
A second simple and persuasive argument for why the IES is close to one is provided by
Lucas (1990) when justifying his calibration of the relative risk aversion coecient for the





If two countries have consumption growth rates diering by one percentage
point, their interest rates must dier by  percentage points (assuming similar
time discount factors). A value of  as high as 4 would thus produce cross-
country interest dierentials much higher than anything we observe, and from
this viewpoint even  = 2 seems high.
Using our notation  =  = 1=  and Lucas' observation implies that a value of the IES
of even 1/2 is low. In order to add more empirical content to his observation we report
international dierences in rates of return on capital in Table 1. The data are based on
capital output ratios reported in Prescott (2002). To infer a return on capital we assume
a capital share of 0.3 for all countries and a depreciation rate of 0.08. These are the same
values of these two parameters that we use in calibrating our model. We are interested in
comparing steady-states so we limit attention to advanced economies. The results reported
in Table 1 show that the maximum dierence in returns on capital for these countries is 2.5
percentage points.
The second part of Lucas' reasoning pertains to output variability. Table 1 also reports
average growth rates of output for the same countries. This data is taken from Maddison's
webpage (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison) and is the sample average over a sample period
that extends from 1980 to 2006. The main thing to note about this data is that the range of
output growth dierences for these countries is 1.2 percent which is very close to the gure
of one percent posited by Lucas.
3.3 Reconciling a low IES with evidence that the IES is high
We rst report results for the complete markets version of our model and then turn to
discuss how the answer changes when households face uninsured idiosyncratic risk.
3.3.1 Complete Markets
Table 2 reports the return on capital and the risk free rate implied by the complete markets
specication. How well does this specication do in accounting for the level facts? The
growth rate of consumption is 2 percent for each conguration of preference parameters
which is the same value used when we discussed the levels facts above. The range of values
for the risk free return reported in Table 2 are also close to the value of 3 percent we posited
above. The risk free return in Table 2 ranges from a high of 4 percent when  = 2 to a low
14of 2.4 percent when  = 100. Following the steps described in Section 3.2.1, if we substitute
the average value of consumption growth and the average value of the risk free return from
the simulations into equation (49) and set  = 1, the resulting lower bound on the IES
ranges from 0.51 when  = 2 to 0.83 when  = 100.
Interestingly, these imputed lower bounds are sometimes inconsistent with the true value
of the IES used when simulating the model. Consider for instance, the case where  = 2.
For that choice of the relative risk aversion parameter the true value of   of 1.5 is well above
the lower bound of 0.51. However, the true values of   of 0.35 and 0.1 lie below this imputed
lower bound.
Why is this derivation failing? The reason why the perfect foresight lower bound fails
is due to the maintained assumption when computing it that the maximum size of the
preference discount factor is one. Our calibration strategy yields values of the discount
factor that are larger than one. Consider row 5 of Table 2 which reports the calibrated value
of the preference discount factor. In virtually all cases  exceeds one when   falls below the
perfect foresight lower bound.10
One might wonder whether it is reasonable to allow  to exceed one. In the context of
the complete market specication there is a clear answer to this question. This specication
can only reproduce investment's share of output and the average growth rate of consump-
tion if the eective discount factor is held xed. There are, also some other good reasons
for calibrating the eective discount factor and allowing the preference discount factor to
adjust.11 First, as we pointed out above existence of equilibrium requires the eective pref-
erence discount factor to be less than one. There is no such restriction on . It can either
be less than one or exceed one. Second, for Epstein-Zin preferences a change in   has two
eects. It changes the IES and also changes the way individuals discount future utility. By
allowing  to adjust we can control for this second eect and isolate the eects of a change
in   on the IES. Third, in our complete market specication there is a direct way to measure
the eective discount factor but no direct way to measure . Under perfect foresight the
eective discount factor in our model can be expressed as:
 ln(eff) = ln(Rf)   ln(gc) (50)
where eff     1 and consumption growth, gc, is constant. It follows that the eective
discount factor is an exact function of consumption growth and the risk free rate under the
assumption of perfect foresight. Table 2 illustrates that perfect foresight is a reasonable
benchmark for moderate values of . Consider the nal row of Table 2. This row reports
10The sole exception occurs when  = 100. For that parameterization the true IES is below the perfect
foresight lower bound and  < 1. A value of risk aversion of this magnitude might appear to be very large.
There is a sense though in which it is too small. The equity premium produced by the model with  = 100
is only 1.6 percent. In U.S. data the average value of the equity premium is above 6 percent.
11The arguments we are about to provide are also made in Reis (2009).
15the value of  that emerges if one uses (49) to solve for  using the value of   and Rf in
the corresponding column along with a consumption growth rate of 2 percent. When risk
aversion is two or four the value of  in the nal row of Table 2 is close to its true value.
The perfect foresight assumption breaks down though when risk aversion is large and   is
small. For instance, when   = 0:1 the value of  implied by (49) is 1.19 while its true value
is 1.070.
A nal noteworthy feature of the complete market specication is that   has no eect
on the size of the risk free return. The reason for this is that under complete markets
k = h =  and the return on total assets in (21) becomes:
R0
a = A0(1   )1  + (1   0)
It then follows from (46) that the value of the risk free return is independent of  .
Next we consider facts related to Lucas' observations on international return dierentials.
To construct return dierentials associated with a one percentage permanent change in
consumption growth we alter the average level of productivity, A, to induce a 1 percent
change in the growth rate of consumption. Using this new stochastic steady-state we then
calculate the expected return on physical capital.
Table 3 reports results that pertain to the dierence facts. We report the simulated
return dierentials for capital and the risk-free return associated with a one percentage
permanent change in consumption growth for alternative congurations of the preference
parameters. The most striking feature of Table 3 is that  , the IES, is the key preference
parameter that matters for the return on assets across steady-states. For values of   that
are less than one, the risk aversion coecient  has a tiny eect on asset returns. For
instance, when   = 0:25 the change in the return on physical capital across steady-states
is 4.2 percent when  is either 2 or 4 and 4.3 percent when  = 100. The value of  has a
somewhat larger but still small eect on the returns when   = 1:5.
The evidence we provided above suggested that the dierence in the return on capital
associated with a permanent change in consumption growth of one percent is about 2.5
percentage points or less. From Table 3 we can see that a value of   of 0.35 yields a 3
percentage change in the return on capital. For purposes of comparison if   = 0:5 instead
the change in the return in capital falls to 2 percent. Thus, the smallest value of   that can
be rendered consistent with the dierence facts lies somewhere between 0.35 and 0.5.
Up to this point we have assumed that the shocks are i.i.d. This assumption is very
convenient because it is easy to solve and analyze the model. Moreover, the solution is
exact. The only equilibrium object that cannot be solve for analytically is !k. It is computed
numerically using the exact nonlinear equilibrium condition (10). However, the assumption
of i.i.d. shocks limits the applicability of this model to business cycle analysis. It is also
possible that allowing for persistent shocks might upset some of our ndings. To investigate
16these possibilities we now relax the assumption of i.i.d shocks and allow the shock process for
the production function At to follow an A.R. 1 instead. We use a second order perturbation
method to solve the model. We also relax the assumption that the support of the shocks is
discrete and allow them to have continuous support. The model is calibrated in the same
way as before.12
We set the persistence parameter on technology to 0.8 and recalibrate the model to match
the same targets as before. Recall that our calibration strategy insures that the model can
reproduce both the volatility of consumption growth and the volatility of output growth.
The relative volatility of investment to output for this specication is 1.5. We repeated
the same experiment reported in Table 3 to see whether allowing for persistence aects our
previous conclusions. With persistent shocks to technology the percentage dierence in the
real return on capital associated with a reduction in the growth rate of consumption of 1
percent is 2.94 percent as compared to 2.96 percent for the case of i.i.d. shocks (see the
column of Table 3 with  = 4 and   = 0:35). The corresponding change in the risk-free
return is now 2.93 percent as compared to 2.96 percent in Table 3. The results are very
similar when we set   = 1:5 and  = 4 instead. Overall, introducing persistence has a
negligible eect on the conclusions we drew assuming i.i.d. shocks.
Allowing for persistent shocks to A signicantly enhances the business cycle properties for
our model. To illustrate this point we Hodrick-Prescott ltered log-level simulated data for
consumption, output and investment using a smoothing parameter of 100. When   = 0:35
and  = 4 the rst order serial correlation of consumption, output and investment are
respectively, 0.49, 0.45 and 0.4. For purposes of comparison Guvenen (2006) reports HP
ltered serial correlations statistics for U.S. data. They are 0.57 for consumption, 0.52 for
output and 0.36 for investment. If we set   = 1:5 and  = 4 instead, then the model implies
that the rst order serial correlations of consumption, output and investment are virtually
unchanged: 0.5 for consumption, 0.45 for output and 0.4 for investment. Overall, the model
with persistent shocks to A captures the general pattern and the magnitude of persistence
in these variables.
Another noteworthy property of the model is that the size of the IES is irrelevant for
the volatility and persistence of output, consumption and investment. The business cycle
performance of our model along these dimensions does not change as the value of the IES
is varied from 0.35 to 1.5.
12As a check on this solution method we rst solve the model for the case of i.i.d. shocks and generate
Monte Carlo draws of length 2500. This produces small dierences as compared to our previous method
which is nearly analytic. For instance, when the IES parameter,  , is 0:35 and the relative risk aversion
parameter, , is set to 4, the return on capital is now 4:08 percent as compared to a value of 4:00 percent
reported in Table 2. The value of the risk-free return is now 3:77 percent as compared to the value of 3:89
percent reported in Table 2 and the dierence in the calibrated value of the preference discount factor across
the two solution methods is 0.0006.
17The evidence we have presented so far opens the door to the possibility that the IES is
low but does not rule out the possibility of a large IES. On the one hand, the we can account
for the level and dierence facts with a value of the IES that is less than 1/2 in conjunction
with a value of  > 1. On the other hand, the same facts can be accounted for with a value
of the IES that is greater than one and a value of  < 1. We now turn to describe some
evidence that can be used to discriminate among these two possibilities.
Campbell (2003) and Yogo (2004) estimate the IES using 2SLS regressions of consump-






=  +   ln(Rf;t+1) + t+1: (51)
where t+1 is an innovation that is orthogonal to information in period t. 13
They nd that when consumption growth is the dependent variable the estimate of the
IES is low. However, when the interest rate appears on the left hand side instead, the
implied value of the IES is large. They also nd that it is not unusual for the estimated
coecient for the IES to be negative. A third result that emerges from their work is that
the standard errors are smaller when consumption growth is the dependent variable. Yogo
(2004) argues that these ndings reect a weak instruments problem and that this problem
is particularly severe when the interest rate is the dependent variable.
We use these results to conduct an encompassing test of the maintained hypothesis of a
low value of the IES versus the maintained hypothesis of a large value of the IES. Results
from this test are reported in Table 4. The top row of this Table reports the maintained value
of   used to simulate data. We simulate data using the specication with serially correlated
shocks to A. The regressions are estimated by 2SLS. In the rst stage the explanatory
variable is regressed on the rst lag of consumption growth and the interest rate. Then
in the second stage the predicted value from the rst regression is used as the explanatory
variable.
Observe that when the true value of   is small the resulting Monte Carlo results are
consistent with the previous ndings of Hall (1988), Campbell (2003) and Yogo (2004).
The value of the second stage regression coecient is small irrespective of the choice of
the dependent variable. This result occurs for sample sizes of 60, 120 and 240. It is also
interesting that for the smaller sample sizes that value of the IES is negative as is found when
using actual data. Finally, observe that the standard errors are smaller when consumption
growth is the dependent variable in the second stage regression. As noted by Yogo (2004)
this specication has less severe weak instrument problems. This follows from the fact that
consumption growth is nearly iid.14
The maintained hypothesis of a large IES, however, fails to reproduce the empirical
13This equation follows from (48).
14See Yogo (2004) for details.
18evidence of small and even negative regression coecients. There is enough information
to identify the value of the IES in even the shortest sample period and the resulting 2SLS
estimates are greater than one in either regression.
These results make intuitive sense. When the true IES is low consumption is not very
responsive to movements in expected interest rates and it is not surprising that one would
need a long sample of data to precisely estimate its value. However, when the true IES
is large consumption is very responsive and one can readily identify the IES using even a
relatively short data sample.
On the basis of this evidence we conclude that on net the maintained hypothesis of a low
IES is more plausible than the alternative of a high IES. The low IES maintained hypothesis
encompasses the empirical evidence in favor of a high IES (the levels and dierence facts).
It is also consistent with the empirical estimates reported in Hall (1998), Campbell (2003)
and Yogo (2004). The high IES maintained hypothesis can also account for the empirical
evidence of a high IES. However, it fails to encompass regression evidence that suggests that
IES is low.
3.3.2 Incomplete Markets
Now we turn to discuss results for the incomplete markets economy. Allowing for uninsured
risk in human capital allows us to reconcile low values of the IES with the levels and dierence
facts using parameterizations in which the preference discount factor is less than 1. The
incomplete markets model also turns out to have some additional restrictions that prove
helpful in identifying the value of the IES.
Table 5 reports results that pertain to the levels facts. Recall that our calibration implies
that the growth rate of consumption is two percent. Observe next that the risk-free rate
in Table 5 has about the same magnitudes as Table 2. It ranges from 3.8 percent to 3.9
percent. Specications with   = 0:15 are just as successful in reproducing these levels facts
as   = 1:5.
Suppose that we use (49) to derive a lower bound on   by setting Rf = 1:039, gc = 1:02
and  = 1. The resulting lower bound on   is 0.52. Interestingly, the results reported in
the nal four columns of Table 5 all violate this lower bound. Under complete markets this
occurred only when  > 1. Here, however, the value of  is less than one. Why is the lower
bound being violated with specications in which  < 1?
In the complete markets specication we found that the perfect foresight linear Euler
equation did a good job of recovering the true value of  when  was 2 or 4. The second
from nal row of Table 5 shows that the value of  implied by equation (49) is very far from
its true value when markets are incomplete. The bias is large for all congurations of the
preference parameters.
The source of the bias is due to the distinction between equations (48) and (49). There
19are two distinctions between these two equations. The rst distinction follows from the
fact that the log of expected consumption growth and the expectation of log consumption
growth are not the same. When markets are complete idiosyncratic risk is insured and
the variance of individual consumption growth is small. This results in a small Jensen's
inequality term. With incomplete markets the variance of individual consumption is much
larger and the Jensen's inequality term cannot be ignored. A second distinction is that
(48) has two variance terms. These two terms disappear under the assumption of perfect
foresight. In our incomplete markets specication the two variance terms are also very
large. To provide the reader with a sense of the magnitude of these factors consider, for
example, the parameterization with   = 0:15 and  = 4. For this parameterization the
dierence between 1= Et ln(ci;t+1=ci;t) and 1=  ln(Etci;t+1=ci;t) is  0:051 and the size of
the two variance terms is  0:2. These dierences between (48) and (49) are almost precisely
big enough to account for the fact that  < 1 with incomplete markets. To see why this is
so consider the nal two rows of Table 5 which report the value of  implied by equations
(49) and (48) respectively. In computing  we use the true value of   and various other
statistics from each simulation. From these estimates we can see that there is a large bias
associated with estimates of  based on (49). However, (48) works extremely well.
Table 5 has some other noteworthy features. One of them is that the value of the IES
does not matter for asset returns. In our incomplete markets specication human capital
is subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. As the risk aversion coecient  is increased
individuals will lower their allocation to human capital and in equilibrium the return on
human capital will rise. Changing  , in contrast, continues to have no eect on the portfolio
allocation decision (see (11)).
Comparing Table 5 with Table 2, reveals that the value of  in Table 5 is always lower
than its corresponding value with complete markets. The pattern of movements is also
dierent. In Table 2 the preference discount factor increases as   is lowered. However, with
incomplete markets the value of  falls as   is lowered. To see why this is the case note that




(lneff + ln)   ln (52)
Under our calibration strategy changing   has no eect on either eff or . In the complete
markets specication (lneff + ln) is positive and  increases when   is reduced. This
eect makes it dicult to entertain low values of   while at the same time keeping  < 1.
With incomplete markets, however, the sign of (lneff +ln) is negative and a lower   also
lowers .
A nal distinction between the complete markets results in Table 2 and the incomplete
markets results in Table 5 is the eect of changes in  on . In the specication with
complete markets  falls if  is increased when   < 1 whereas  increases if  is increased
20when   > 1. Under the assumption of incomplete markets an increase in  lowers  in Table
5 both when   is less than one and also when   is greater than one. We can oer some
intuition for this property of the incomplete markets model. Consider rst the case where
  < 1. Equation (39) and (1   !c) =    1 yield
ln(   1) = lngc   ln(E  Ra;t+1) (53)
or
  ln() =  (1    )(ln(E  Ra;t+1)   ln)     ln(E  Ra;t+1) + lngc (54)
Note that an increase in  also increases, (ln(E  Ra;t+1) ln), which is a form of risk premium
for holding portfolio a. The expected cross-sectional return on assets, E  Ra;t+1, increases
because households demand a higher return when they are more risk averse. Since  is a
concave function of Ra;i;t the dierence also increases. When   > 1, the answer will depend
on the magnitude of . In Table 5 when   = 1:5 increasing  from 2 to 4 results in an
increase in  and thus  falls.
Table 6 reports the comparative steady-state results for the incomplete markets economy
that pertain to the dierence facts. Recall that the nature of the experiment is to consider
a change in the level of technology A that produces a 1 percent change in consumption
growth and to then determine the corresponding change in the return on physical capital.
The incomplete markets model is more successful in reproducing the dierence facts than
the complete markets specication in the sense that it is possible to reconcile a lower value
of   with empirical evidence that cross-country dierences in the return on capital are small.
For instance, when  = 4 and   = 0:35 the dierence in the return on capital associated
with a one percentage change in consumption is 1.82 percent. This value is lower than the
value of 2.9 percent that was produced by the complete markets model. It is also less than
the value of 2.5 percent that we reported in Table 1 and even falls below Lucas' (1990)
gure of 2 percent. If one uses a value of 2.5 percent from Table 1 as a cuto point we can
entertain values of   that are less than 0.2.
This reconciliation of a low IES with the dierence facts is not entirely satisfactory. In
the incomplete markets model a high value of  is needed to reconcile low values of   with
the facts on cross country returns on capital. High values of  also have implications for
average returns and in particular the return on human capital. For instance, using the same
value of   = 0:35 when  = 4 the average return on human capital is 26.71 percent (see
Table 5). When  = 2 it falls to 14.35 percent.
The fact that the return on human capital is independent of the setting of   suggests a
strategy for jointly identifying both psi and . Table 7 reports alternative combinations of
 and   that are consistent with a 3 percent change in the return on physical capital.
To get some idea of the plausible range of values for the return on human capital,
Christiansen, Jensen and Nielsen (2007) report returns for alternative professions. The
21results we report in the nal column of Table 7 (25 percent) correspond to the returns of
physicians reported by Christiansen, Jensen and Nielsen (2007). They report returns on
human capital for lawyers to be a bit lower at about 14.5 percent. Palacios-Huerta (2003)
reports returns on human capital by highest degree attained, race and gender. Returns
for white males with a college degree and one to ve years of experience are 14.2 percent.
Returns for white males with no college and one to ve years of experience are 5.9 percent.
Krebs (2003) argues that a return of about 12 percent is reasonable using the same model
as ours with time additive preferences.
Taken together these estimates suggest that results reported in the middle two columns
of Table 6 are the most relevant. These columns yield an IES of between 0.3 and 0.25 and
a risk aversion coecient of around 2. Looking across all four columns one sees that the
moments we have chosen impose tight restrictions on the values of   and . On the one
hand, values of   much above 0.35 are ruled out by the restriction that  be non-negative.
On the other hand, values of   lower than 0.15 imply implausibly large values of the return
on human capital.
The parameterizations that emerge from our analysis are quite close to the parameter-
ization used by Gomes and Michaelides (2007) in a model that accounts for a variety of
asset pricing anamolies with two types of agents, life-cycle eects, limited participation and
incomplete markets. They choose the relative risk aversion coecients to be 1.1 and 5 and
set the IES to respectively 0.1 and 0.4 for the two types of agents.
It is computationally more burdensome activity to solve and simulate the incomplete
market version of our model with persistent shocks. However, our complete market results
suggest that the results we have documented here with i.i.d. shocks are likely to be robust
to this assumption.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed two ways to reconcile a low IES with previous evidence that has
been used to argue that the IES is close to one. When markets are complete our reconciliation
requires a value of the preference discount factor that is larger than one. When markets are
incomplete the preference discount factor for our specications with a low IES is always less
than one.
We also provided some new empirical evidence that suggests a low value of the IES
is more plausible than a large value. Our specications that posit low values of the IES
encompass empirical observations that suggest the IES is large. However, our specications
with a large IES fail to encompass regression evidence that the IES is low.
One distinct advantage of our framework is that it is easy to compute the exact equilib-
rium allocations and prices. There is only one nonlinear equation to be solved. The rest of
22the equilibrium can be calculated in closed form. However, there are also costs. We require
that shocks be i.i.d both across individuals and over time. For the complete market model
we relaxed this assumption and computed numerical solutions. Those solutions indicated
that the results are robust to the maintained assumption that shocks are i.i.d.
A remaining question is whether one can also reconcile a low value of the IES with the
equity premium puzzle. The results for the incomplete market model suggest that if the
return on equity has an idiosyncratic uninsured component that this is possible. The excess
returns on human capital in Table 7 are as large as 20 percent. The question then is why
would equity returns have an idiosyncratic component? Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) provide
an answer to this question. They consider a setting where agents experience idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks. These liquidity shocks introduce an idiosyncratic component into the return
on equity. In our current work we are considering extensions to our model along these lines.
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24Country
Annual real return on 
capital  (capital share 
0.3)
Annual Average Growth 









United Kingdom 3.5% 2.1%
United States 5.0% 1.9%
*Capital output ratios are taken from Prescott (2002). We assume Cobb-Douglas technology with a 
capital share of 0.3 in all countries and a common depreciation rate of 0.08 percent per year. The data 
on per capita output growth rates are from Maddison's webpage  (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison)  and 
are average growth rates for the sample period 1980-2006.









2 4 100 2 4 100 2 4 100
Expected real 
return on  capital
4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00%
Real risk-free 
return








0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Value of # 
implied by 
perfect foresight  
0.97 0.98 0.99 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.17 1.17 1.19
Table 2
Complete Markets Model
Implications for returns and prefeence discount rates
26Intertemporal Elasticity of 
Substitution (ψ)
1.5 1.5 1.5 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.25
Relative risk aversion 
coefficient (γ)
2 4 100 2 4 100 2 4 100
Percentage difference in real 
return on capital
0.68% 0.68% 0.98% 2.96% 2.96% 3.04% 4.2% 4.2% 4.3%
Percentage difference in risk-
free return
0.68% 0.68% 0.98% 2.96% 2.96% 3.04% 4.2% 4.2% 4.4%
Table 3
Complete markets model
Effect of a 1 percent reduction in consumption growth on the real return on capital
27Sample Size MC Mean Mean MC SE SD MC Estimates MC Mean Mean MC SE SD MC Estimates
60 -0.34 1.21 1.2 0.06 1.27 0.92
120 -0.19 0.78 0.77 0.33 3.57 1.93
240 0.01 0.51 0.54 0.32 4.79 2.76
Sample Size MC Mean Mean MC SE SD MC Estimates MC Mean Mean MC SE SD MC Estimates
60 -0.16 1.2 1.2 -0.04 3.12 1.51
120 -0.02 0.76 0.76 0.2 1.4 1.26
240 0.18 0.51 0.54 0.31 3.81 2.48
Sample Size MC Mean Mean MC SE SD MC Estimates MC Mean Mean MC SE SD MC Estimates
60 -0.08 1.2 1.32 -0.05 5.21 2.25
120 0.19 0.76 0.76 0.36 2.49 1.54
240 0.29 0.5 0.49 0.89 5.67 2.8
Sample Size MC Mean Mean MC SE SD MC Estimates MC Mean Mean MC SE SD MC Estimates
60 1.43 1.2 1.17 0.52 1.25 0.94
120 1.44 0.75 0.71 0.58 0.38 0.36

















Two stage least squares estimates of the slope coefficients in the regressions !ct+1 =! +"rf ,t+1 +#t+1 
and rf ,t+1 =$ +"
"1!ct+1 +ut+1 using synthetic data generated from the complete markets model.*
28Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
(!)
1.5 1.5 0.35 0.35 0.25 0.15
Relative risk aversion coefficient (") 2 4 2 4 4 4
Real return on physical capital 3.99% 3.95% 3.99% 3.95% 3.95% 3.95%
Real return on human capital 14.35% 26.71% 14.35% 26.71% 26.71% 26.71%
Real return on total assets 9.75% 14.09% 9.75% 14.09% 14.09% 14.09%
Real risk-free return 3.93% 3.83% 3.93% 3.83% 3.83% 3.83%
Preference discount factor 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.85 0.82 0.75
Effective preference discount factor 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.89 0.89 0.89
Value of # implied by perfect foresight 0.97 0.98 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.10
Value of # implied by second order 
approximation
0.93 0.90 0.91 0.84 0.81 0.74
Table 5
Incomplete markets model
Implications for returns and preference discount rates
29Intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution (!)
1.5 1.5 0.35 0.35 0.25 0.15
Relative risk aversion coefficient (") 2 4 2 4 4 4
Percentage difference in real return 
on physical capital
0.64% 0.56% 2.45% 1.82% 2.24% 2.59%
Percentage difference in real return 
on wealth
0.73% 0.78% 2.83% 2.57% 3.19% 3.72%
Percentage difference in risk free rate 0.64% 0.56% 2.46% 1.82% 2.24% 2.59%
Table 6
Incomplete markets model
Effect of a 1 percent reduction in consumption growth on real returns
Intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution (!)
0.350 0.300 0.250 0.15
Relative risk aversion coefficient 
(")
0.5 1.7 2.4 3.7
Return on physical capital 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Return on human capital 6.1% 12.4% 16.7% 25.0%
Return on total assets 5.4% 8.8% 10.7% 13.6%
Effective discount factor 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.90
Table 7
Incomplete Markets Model
Risk Aversion and the real return on human capital
30